Will Poland Leave the EU? Polexit Arguments For and Against

For now, leaving the EU (Polexit) remains a demand of only part of Poland’s political spectrum and roughly a quarter of the population, while most Poles still support EU membership.

In short

• Roughly one in four Poles supports leaving the EU — 24.7% according to IBRiS in December 2025, the highest figure in 22 years of membership.
• Support for Polexit is lowest among voters for Donald Tusk (3%) and young people aged 18–30 (13%).
• Poland has received €174 billion in EU investment and roughly €5 billion a year in agricultural subsidies.
• In 2025, five years after Brexit, Britain signed an agreement to align its laws with the EU — without a vote in how they’re made.
• Over 40% of voters for three right-wing Polish parties support leaving the EU, though none of them officially makes it a stated goal.

What Polexit Means and Who in Poland Is Calling for It

Polexit is a term modeled on Brexit, denoting Poland’s potential withdrawal from the European Union. Some Polish citizens are calling not only for leaving the EU but also for simultaneously leaving NATO and withdrawing American troops from Polish territory.

The current debate was triggered by a public statement from Krzysztof Bosak, deputy speaker of the Sejm from the Confederation party: the price of full access to the EU single market is submission to EU law, including climate policy, which is why the British left — to restore sovereignty and negotiate a deal with the EU as an outside partner. In a September 2 debate, Bosak effectively defended this British-style relationship, in which a country trades with the EU as an external partner without any influence over its decisions.

The formal demand for Polexit comes from Grzegorz Braun’s Confederation of the Polish Crown, which calls leaving the EU the only way to restore Poland’s sovereignty. The Confederation led by Mentzen and Bosak does not officially call for Polexit, but its leader Mentzen regularly criticizes the European Union, and Bosak himself publicly insists on renegotiating the terms of Poland’s EU membership.

The Norway Model, the British Model, and Full Membership: Three Paths for Poland

Magdalena Adamowicz, a member of the European Parliament for the Civic Coalition, compared three possible models of Poland’s relationship with the European Union using the example of a truck carrying goods across the border with Germany.

Model	Border and customs	Payments and conditions
Norway	EU rules apply, but the country has no vote in EU institutions	€400 million in annual contributions; agriculture is excluded from the free trade agreement and subject to tariffs
British (post-Brexit)	The truck stops at the border for customs and veterinary checks	Small businesses can’t absorb the paperwork costs and exit the market
Full EU membership	The truck drives through without stopping, no tariffs, no checks	No market-access fees and no voting restrictions

Under the Norway model, agricultural tariffs would hit Poland especially hard: its farmers export nearly €50 billion worth of agricultural products every year, and that trade is exactly what would face the added charges. The British model means customs clearance for every shipment — costs that hit small businesses hardest, since they lack the resources to handle constant inspections. Only full membership keeps the truck moving without stops, tariffs, or border checks.

What Britain’s Post-Brexit Experience Actually Showed

The British government itself calculated the consequences of leaving the European Union: according to the UK government’s own estimate, Brexit will reduce the economy’s long-term productivity by about 4% over 15 years — not an annual loss, but a one-off drop in potential, which works out to roughly £100 billion in lost economic potential. That sum exceeds Britain’s annual spending on its armed forces — defense and security combined.

The UK economy is significantly stronger than Poland’s, and it’s precisely this example that’s used to gauge what leaving the union could cost Poland. If the losses are significant even for a stronger economy, they could prove more painful for a weaker one.

Five years after leaving, Britain did not keep the sovereignty it was promised — instead it went back to aligning with EU rules: in May 2025 it signed an agreement for dynamic alignment of its legislation with EU law and the role of the EU court. Formally, the country ended up with the same rules that apply inside the EU, but now without a vote in how they’re made — decisions are simply imposed unilaterally.

For Polish supporters of leaving the EU, the sovereignty argument is central: they want to leave so they can set their own rules. Britain’s experience shows the opposite outcome: the country left, was independent for a while, and now follows the same laws as the EU — just without any say in shaping them.

the country left, was independent for a while, and now follows the same laws as the EU — just without any say in shaping them

Does Brussels Really Make Decisions Without Poland

Most decisions in the European Union are made by ministers and heads of government of member states, Poland included — typically by qualified majority voting, with unanimity required only in a handful of sensitive areas like foreign policy or taxation. Brussels isn’t some outside force imposing things here: the decisions Polish right-wing politicians now complain about were signed off by Polish officials themselves.

The Green Deal was backed by Poland’s own commissioner, Janusz Wojciechowski, from the Law and Justice party. EU enlargement was approved by Prime Minister Beata Szydło. The Mercosur trade agreement was signed by Poland alongside other EU members — all of this happened under Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who is now proposing to pull Poland out of the Schengen area and close its borders.

So the same politicians who voted for these decisions in the Council of the European Union for years are now shifting the blame for their consequences onto an abstract “Brussels.” That’s convenient as electoral tactics, but it doesn’t match how decisions in the EU actually get made.

the same politicians who voted for these decisions in the Council of the European Union for years are now shifting the blame for their consequences onto an abstract “Brussels.”

What Poland Has Gained From EU Membership

Poland is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the European Union in direct financial terms:

• €174 billion in investment — the total amount Poland has received from the EU.
• around €5 billion in subsidies every year — the amount Polish farmers have received annually since 2004.
• €44 billion in duty-free agricultural exports — the value of Polish farm products sold abroad thanks to tariff-free access to EU markets.

Tellingly, part of the group calling for leaving the union is farmers — the very category that receives annual subsidies and tariff-free access to export markets. This group’s grievances are directed not at the European Union as an institution, but at Poland’s own domestic agricultural policy.

How Many Poles Support Leaving the EU: 2025–2026 Poll Data

Date	Polling firm	Support for leaving the EU	Support for staying in the EU
December 2025	IBRiS	24.7%	—
January 2026	Pollster	22%	69%
May 2026	Pollster	21%	—
June 2026	Pollster	24%	—

The highest level of open support for Polexit was recorded in December 2025 by the polling firm IBRiS — 24.7% of Poles backed starting the process of leaving the European Union. That’s the highest figure across all 22 years of Poland’s EU membership, which began in 2004.

Subsequent polls show a similar, if somewhat lower, level: in January 2026 Pollster recorded 22% support for leaving against 69% for staying, 21% in May, and 24% in June. The exact result depends on the methodology and phrasing of the question in each specific poll. Taken together, the data paints one picture: roughly one in four Poles currently supports the country leaving the European Union.

Who in Polish Society Backs Leaving, and Who Opposes It

Support for Polexit is lowest among young people aged 18–30 — just 13%. It’s even lower among voters for Donald Tusk and his coalition: only 3% of them want to leave the EU, meaning supporters of the ruling coalition are practically unanimous in favor of EU membership. Among residents of large cities, 15% support leaving — also noticeably below the national average.

The divide runs along several lines at once: city versus countryside, educated versus less educated, young versus middle-aged, right versus center and left. Rural residents back leaving the EU more often than city dwellers, and support for Polexit is also higher among people with lower levels of education. Another group with high support for leaving is supporters of far-right parties: for them, the demand to leave the EU isn’t a standalone position but part of the ideology that underpins the entire far-right camp.

for them, the demand to leave the EU isn’t a standalone position but part of the ideology that underpins the entire far-right camp

Which Political Forces in Poland Support Polexit

The Confederation party and Grzegorz Braun’s Confederation of the Polish Crown officially consider Polexit the only way out and a necessary condition for restoring Poland’s sovereignty. The Confederation led by Mentzen and Bosak takes a more cautious stance: the party doesn’t officially call for leaving the EU, though it regularly criticizes the union and demands changes to Poland’s membership terms. Despite the lack of an official slogan, 41% of this party’s voters support leaving the EU.

Law and Justice also doesn’t formally call for Polexit, but according to a researcher at Jagiellonian University, its anti-European rhetoric has grown increasingly radical. Among voters of opposition parties, which include Law and Justice, 43% support leaving the EU.

None of the major parties declares leaving the EU an official goal. But three right-wing political forces together poll above 40% of voters, and among that audience, support for Polexit is a mass position, not a marginal one.

Frequently asked questions

Could Polexit actually happen anytime soon

For now, it’s unlikely: none of the major parties, including Law and Justice, officially puts leaving the EU forward as a goal, and only about one in four Poles openly supports withdrawal. Only Braun’s Confederation of the Polish Crown and part of the Confederation officially demand Polexit. Without support from a majority of the population and the major parties, the withdrawal process has no political basis to launch.

Why do farmers gain the most from the EU while also criticizing it

Polish farmers receive about €5 billion a year in subsidies and have tariff-free access to €44 billion worth of exports — direct financial benefits from membership. Yet some of them call for leaving the EU not because of these figures, but out of dissatisfaction with Poland’s own domestic agricultural policy. In other words, their grievances target the Polish government’s decisions, not the union itself.

Is there a legal procedure for a country to leave the EU

The material covers the political debate around Polexit, but the actual withdrawal procedure (similar to the mechanism Britain used) isn’t described in detail. What is known is that Britain, after leaving, still ended up realigning with EU rules in May 2025 — this time without a vote. That shows dependence on the union’s rules can persist even after formal withdrawal.

Why do young Poles support leaving the EU less than older generations

Among people aged 18–30, only 13% support leaving the EU — the lowest figure of any age group. The divide runs along lines of city versus countryside and education level and political views, and young people are more likely to live in cities and hold higher levels of education — groups where support for Polexit is consistently lower. This suggests age itself isn’t the driver; it’s the social factors that tend to come with it.

Can Poland’s situation really be compared directly to Britain’s

Not entirely: the UK economy is significantly stronger than Poland’s, so Britain’s experience is used as a point of reference rather than a direct forecast. If even a stronger economy lost about 4% of long-term productivity over 15 years, the consequences for Poland’s weaker economy could turn out proportionally worse. It’s an argument for caution, not a precise prediction for Poland.